



Freedom Convoy/Ambassador Bridge Protest

(WPS: 22-11390, OPP: RM22009444)

Debrief Request Form

Name	Insp Andrew Randall (Collation of input / feedback from MCB / SV of various ranks)
Responsibility/Team Assignment	• MCB – Process Arrests / Criminal Charge Files • MCB – assigned at EOC • MCB – Follow-up Investigations re: Protest Leaders / Organizers • SVU / WECAS Child Apprehension Team

Summary of Involvement (point form acceptable)
• Responsible for maintaining communication with the Detention Unit with those arrested in relation to the protest, along with the processing Criminal Charge Files. • Facilitate requests for MCB personnel (Constables) to attend EOC. • Review with Crown the charges that would be applicable, and develop of Arrest Plan (MCB EOC PC) • Discussion of investigative processes, and follow-up, regarding charges against Protest Leaders / Organizers • Due to Protesters / Parents involved in the truck convoy having children present, children put in dangerous situation and/or Protesters / Parents with children present are arrest. Child becomes a child in need of protection, SVU worked in conjunction with Children's Aid Society to create an Operations Plan.

What Did The WPS Do Well?	Recommendations for Improvement
• The protest was ended peacefully without any acts of violence, property damage, etc., through strategic Public Order Unit Plans from our partner Police Agencies. Overall, the mission to clear the road was accomplished in a safe methodical fashion. • The MCB Office was well staffed to process Custody Files. (1 Staff Sergeant / minimum – 2 Sergeants / minimum - 4 Constables) • The organization of the files, and tracking of all the arrests was done well. A spreadsheet was created, and shared regularly with the EOC so they had a running total of arrests. • The spreadsheet continues to assist with the monitoring of the status of the Criminal Charge Files. It was also shared with Roberta Morgan (Charge Processing) and the Crown's Office. • The <i>Preamble</i> for the IO (Initial Officer Report) and the CS (Charge Summary) was good • Support from the Crown's Office was excellent and timely for various issues that arose on the Sunday of the arrests. • An Operations Plan regarding the apprehension of children present was in place in advance of arrests being made. (Completed by SVU Sergeant) ○ Operation Plan in place to have three vehicles as part of the child apprehension team. ○ Two vehicles contained one SVU Investigator and one WECAS Case Worker. A third vehicle was a roaming vehicle which contained one SVU Investigator and the SVU Sergeant.	• All Operations Plans should be distributed to all affected areas / personnel. It appeared that the Arrest Plan was not previously shared with the other agencies, let alone our own members. (It appeared that Public Order Unit members, Prisoner Transport Driver, Training Branch Members, etc. were not aware of their respective responsibilities; however they were named in the Plan) ○ The Arrest Plan refers to the Public Order Unit Plan, however, it was never shared with MCB. ○ The Towing/Seizing Plan should have been distributed. MCB received inquiries regarding status of towed/seized vehicles. However, the Plan was never shared with MCB. (Were vehicles towed under EMPCA, Offence Related Property (ORP), Abandoned, etc.?) • The Arrest Template was not sufficient and is not acceptable for court. We could provide information on different charges and let the arresting offices select the appropriate charge. The Arresting Officers need to cognizant that they must articulate their respective arrests, accordingly. ○ The arresting officers need to be aware that each arrest is an <u>individual</u> incident related to one big event (mischief / disobey court order / trespass / obstruct). Reports need to be <u>specific</u> to their respective arrests and must be reflected in the reports. (Same reports were too generic.) • Arrests reports were too delayed in reaching the MCB Office. At end of day on the 13th, MCB only had one arrest report. Reports and

○ All vehicles were equipped with car seats provided by WECAS. ○ Goal: To protect and ensure the safety of children present at protest. ○ Plan: If front line officers determined there was a child in need of protection, the roaming vehicle would attend their location and apprehend the child. The child / children would then be brought back to the two other waiting vehicles with the WECAS Case Worker. Appropriate arrangements would be made by WECAS to place the child in a safe location. ○ The team was assigned to the parking lot east of the Duty Free, at Patricia and Union Street, working Saturday February 12 (05:00 to 20:00hrs) and Sunday February 13 (05:00 to 18:00hrs) ○ The remainder of the time, SVU remained on-call • The Windsor Police Service worked well in conjunction with other community partners (WECAS). • The SVU Sergeant was in constant contact with WECAS Executive Director for planning, arrangements, and scheduling. • The Investigations Inspector made attempts to keep the SVU team updated, and apprised of plans of the dynamic changing situation. • The SVU Sergeant maintained a healthy professional relationship with WECAS to ensure the safety of their case workers. • MCB took carriage of investigations the best they could based on information presented, and provided.	notes must be completed prior to the end of shift; preferably, as soon as possible. ○ Recommendation is that Windsor Police Service members be the Arresting Officers (integrated behind the POU's) as it would facilitate more streamlined follow up on missing information. • MCB staffing at the EOC was random and often changed from team to team. A designated person(s) of rank is recommended for continuity. ○ Consideration should have been given to including Investigators with seniority and rank to provide investigating advice. (Appoint one MCB Staff Sergeant / Sergeant to deal with everything related to the protest arrests. This would greatly assist in communication between the MCB office and the MCB representative, at the EOC.) • There should have been designated Video Coordinator / Social Media Coordinator positions, at the EOC, on Day 1, to facilitate the collection of evidence proactively rather than reactively. • Minimum two people should be assigned to the wagon, including an officer of rank. If the transport sheet with all the names of the Officers who touched the person is not completed, the Sergeant can make the determination if the person should be RNC or follow-up is required prior to transport. • A process needs to be in place to deal with mass arrests. (Assigned to Insp Deluca) A large number of arrests at the same time caused significant delay in booking each individual in cells. It also inhibited the interviewing of any of the arrested parties.
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	• Contact information should be disseminated – List of who is doing what at the EOC and the Training Branch would have been helpful to assist with answering questions. • A clear understanding of the role of the OPP Investigative Teams should have been known. (The OPP was on standby to assist with files, but MCB was called at approx. 1400 hrs. and asked if help was needed. MCB Staff Sergeant declined the assistance, and was left with the impression that the OPP Investigators were relieved of their duty). The OPP uses a different RMS (Niche) – was the plan for them to process arrests with our RMS? In the future the OPP Investigative Team(s) should be integrated at HQ, instead of the Tiered Classroom, at the Training Branch. • Consideration should be given to the use of multiple drones to record the event. (The drone footage was good but missed many of the arrests.) • Tasks should be clearly identified for officers. (A detailed description of their roles and responsibilities required of each individual attending the EOC on behalf of a specialty unit would assist.) • Daily updates were not disseminated to MCB due to its confidential content, as per EOC. There needs to be an increased open line of communication. ○ As above, there should be consistent chain of reporting back to investigators (It seemed to be always “ad hoc” with not all involved in the process.) There seemed to be multiple points of contact with members of the EOC (Inspectors, Staff Sergeants, Constables) • It is suggested that a Patrol Sergeant be assigned to roam, and check the security of the perimeter as it was noticed that, during the protest, there was a breakdown in the perimeter through parking lots, which allowed
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	protestor vehicles / people into the inner perimeter. (It was observed that Police Vehicles assigned to the perimeter locations changed at different times, and resulted in areas left open for breaches of the perimeter.)
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Additional Comments

- It was great experience being a part of the team and having a small part in the success of the operation. Overall, the operation went very well for an organization that never dealt with this before. I believe the community was satisfied with our measured approach to the issue and put the Service in a good light.
- The operation plan was adequate but I'm not sure if it was communicated properly. I spoke to Officers on the road and they didn't know who was doing reports. One specific officer told me they were on the bus going to the scene and London POU was telling them that "today was the day" and the WPS Officer had no idea what was going on. We have examples of protesters being grabbed by a POU and handed off to a "hands team" and then handed over to the transport officer. Nobody advised the person they were under arrest and provided constitutional rights. I worry that that the great work done on the street may be overlooked / forgotten when each case goes to court. Not sure if each person really understood what their role was in relation to reporting.
- Overall I think the operation was a huge success.
- MCB office seemed to be spectators to the protest and learned more information from live TV than from the chain of command. Hard to say what went well since we were left in the dark for most of the protest. (There was a lack of communication from the EOC on pre-arrangement operation plans, and throughout the weekend.)
- Observed persons not sure of their duties or tasks – utilization of constables when should have identified experienced investigators of rank.
- For teams assigned to the protest / event there should be a direct person or contact at the EOC to receive updates, changes, take concerns.
- Required a dedicated contact at EOC for questions – always changing. Emails, phone calls were forwarded to MCB with no consistent approach to ensure everyone was included as a result information was parsed out differently to however answer the phone.
- Confusion from the outset if persons would be charged or not – mixed messages to protesters.
- Was this a peacefully protest that was allowed? If so, when was the line drawn in the sand to say that an individual would be charged with mischief?
- The laying of the CC 127 charge (Disobey Court Order) late in the day caused delays in releasing arrested parties. There was mixed messages from command. The EOC advised that charges for the protest for breaching injunction would occur to persons arrested after 1400 hrs. The Deputy Chief advised all persons would be charged with breach of injunction (Disobey Court Order). This caused confusion to attend cells and advise of the new charge.
- At the beginning of the protest there didn't seem to be any consideration given to the laying of charges against Protest Leader and Organizers (or those identified as being involved, but departed prior to being arrested), however, follow-up is now required with the OPP to review their intelligence information that they had gathered to determine whether charges are warranted.

- There was no preservation of social media as evidence – only monitored.
- OPP Incident Reports, and WPS Booking sheets were not completed in some cases, or lacked necessary information.
- Nobody should have been taken into custody and transported to WPS until the chain of continuity with the prisoner was identified. The transport sheet should also ensure that RTC is read, person knows why they are under arrest etc.
- Computers were readily available at the Training Branch; however, at the outset, outside Policing Agencies didn't seem to be aware of their existence, and requirement to complete their reports and submit their notes, prior to the completion of their Tour of Duty.
- All Operations Plans should be e-mailed or reviewed so that consultation can be made with the community partners (WECAS) to address their concerns, as their employees were present.
- Suggest that a Crown Attorney were present at the EOC during the days preceding the event to assist with questions pertaining to charges and as someone who can provide legal advice directly to the CIC.
- Safety concerns were brought forward by WECAS that appeared to be ignored or not discussed with the SVU Sergeant, prior to the final operation plans being in place.
- The Investigations Inspector maintained an open communication line with team to provide updates. This was of great assistance as the WECAS Executive Director was looking for updates throughout the incident.
- The roaming food vehicle provided officers with a break and was very considerate and showed care in taking care of officers on scene.
- Overall the team, including WECAS members were proud of how WPS handled the unfortunate, unprecedented situation.
- The team was front row when the convoy of officers ascended to the entrance of the Ambassador Bridge and to see the magnitude of support, planning and officers from all over standing to protect the community was glorious. I was concerned for the safety of the front line and so proud at the same time. The patience and restraint was fantastic.
- The Debriefing Form is excellent, to learn for the future.